EARLY COMMENTARIES HUME'S WRITINGS
                                  
                                  
                                  
                   "Hume's Account of Necessity"
                                  
                                from
                                  
            <Commonsense: or, The Englishman's Journal>
                                  
                                1740

                               5/1/95

Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for
details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working
draft; please report errors.[1]

Editor's note: The anonymous author of this essay identifies himself
as the author of <An Essay towards demonstrating the Immateriality
and Free-Agency of the Soul>, (London, 1740). The aim of the essay
is to prevent Hume's account of determinism from having "any
mischievous effect upon the opinions or morals of mankind." After a
summary of Hume's views on determinism, begins his refutation. The
issues of free will and necessary connection, he believes, are
related, and that the notion of "necessary connection" is explained
by Newton as cohesion, attraction, repulsion and communication of
motion. The proof that we are free is that we recognize causal
necessity in external objects only because such necessity stands in
sharp contrast to human freedom. The mischievous threat of Hume's
theory is its implication that our conduct is beyond our control. He
agrees that there is a causal-like relation between our motives and
the morally significant actions which they elicit, but our feeling
of freedom shows that this connection is not absolute. Changing
subjects, he argues contrary to Hume that space is indeed infinitely
divisible in a speculative sense; for, given any spatial object
considered as a whole, it must necessarily be seen to have parts.
For a discussion of this essay, see E.C. Mossner, "The First Answer
to Hume's <Treatise>: An Unnoticed Item of 1740," in <Journal of the
History of Ideas>, 1951, Vol. 12, pp. 291-294.

                                  
                              * * * *
                                  
             COMMONSENSE: OR, THE ENGLISHMAN'S JOURNAL
                                  
                  Saturday, July 5, 1740, pp. 1-2


SOME of our Papers being designed for the Learned, and others for
the Unlearned, we hope the latter will, in Complaisance to the
former, excuse our publishing the following Dissertation, which, we
think, may be of great Use, tho' it may not perhaps be so
entertaining to those that never have employed their Thoughts about
such Subjects.

                 <To the> AUTHOR <of> COMMON SENSE.
     <SIR>,
AS I published lately <An Essay towards demonstrating the
Immateriality and Free Agency of the Soul>, which one of your
Correspondents has already taken notice of, and as the establishing
of both these Doctrines is, in my Opinion necessary for the
Establishment of Religion, Virtue, and Morality, nay, and even of
<social Liberty> itself, I must beg you'll [by printer] give what
follows a Place in your Paper.
     The <Liberty> of Human Action is a Doctrine so agreeable to
Reason, and to the common Sense of Mankind, that it is never opposed
but by those who either lay down to themselves <false Principles>,
or <mistake> the <Terms> they make Use of; which is the chief Cause
of that impenetrable Obscurity and incomprehensible Jargon, we find
in the Writings of almost all those, who have hitherto appeared as
<Advocates> for <Necessity>.
     Mr. <Collins>, I think, is the only one, who has treated the
Subject with any Order or Perspicuity. As he was a Gentleman of a
most extensive Genius, and a clear Understanding, he has, indeed,
expressed himself so as to be understood; but I have, in the above
mentioned Essay, answered every Philosophical Argument he has
advanced in favour of <Necessity>; and, I hope, I have done it to
the Satisfaction of all those who delight in what is plain and easy,
and do not think that every piece of <Metaphysicks> ought to <soar>
above the <common Reach> of <Human Capacity>.
     What follows, I intend as a <short> Answer to a <long> Book
lately published, intitled, <A Treatise of Human Nature>, the Author
of which seems, if I understand him, which, I profess, I am not
quite sure of, to adopt the <Doctrine of Necessity>, in the 4th and
last Part of the 2d Book of his <tedious> Performance; but,
according to Custom, he stumbles at his first setting out.
     He desires it may be observed, and I desire it too, "That by
the <Will>, he means nothing but <the internal Impression we feel
and are conscious of, when we knowingly give Rise to any new Motion
of our Body, or new Perception of our Mind>".[2] Now, does not every
one see, that by this Definition he means, if he means what every
understanding Man must mean, not the <Will>, or what we call the
<Act of Volition>. After this Definition he goes on thus.
'[printer?] This Impression; (meaning the <Will>) like the preceding
ones of Pride and Humility, Love and Hatred, 'tis impossible to
define, and needless to describe any farther, &c." What Pity it is,
he did not think of this before he gave us his Definition? But by
his Favour, if I understand the <English> Language, (which is
generally the Dispute among <Metaphysicians>) neither the Will, nor
Pride of Humility, nor Love or Hatred, ought to be called
<Impressions>. The <Will> is a <Faculty>; and <Pride, Humility,
Love>, and <Hatred> are <Passions> of the <Human Soul>.
     Then he tells us, "Every Object (<material> he means) is
determined by an <absolute Fate> to a certain Degree and direction
of its Motion. &c".[3] But I, as a <Philosopher>, and as a
<Christian>, must say, that no <material> Object is determined by an
<absolute Fate> to any Thing; for all Objects, <meerly material>,
are determined in their Motions and Directions, by those <Qualities>
which were <given> to them, and still <preserved> in them, <by God
Almighty>, as I have shewn in my Essay, Chap. 9th.
     After having established, as he supposes, the <absolute Fate>
by which the Motions and Directions of <material Objects> are
determined, he proceeds to examine the Motions and Directions, or
rather the <Actions>, of the <Mind>, and tells us, "That in no
single Instance the <ultimate Connexion> of any Objects is
discoverable, either by our Senses or Reason, and that we can never
penetrate so far into the Essence and Construction of Bodies, as to
perceive the <Principle>, on which their mutual Influence depends.
'Tis their <constant Union> alone, with which we are acquainted; and
'tis from the <constant Union> the <Necessity> arises. If Objects
had not an uniform and regular Conjunction with each other, we
should never arrive at any Idea of Cause and Effect; and even after
all, the <Necessity> which enters into that Idea, is nothing but a
Determination of the Mind to pass from one Object to its usual
Attendant, and infer the Existence of one from that of the other.[4]
     I shall take no Notice of this <Novel> Sort of Diction, because
most <Metaphysicians>, to the great prejudice of the Science, affect
to think, and to express their Thoughts, in a Method <peculiar> to
themselves; but I must observe, that if the Author had read, and
considered (for there is a great Difference) the <Philosophical>
Works of the great <Sir Isaac Newton>, he would have perceived, that
the <ultimate Connexion> of Objects, (by which, I suppose, he means
<Causes> and <Effects>) so far as it depends upon, or proceeds from
any <Quality> in <Matter>, has been discovered, and that it depends
upon or proceeds from Cohesion, Attraction, Repulsion, and
Communication of Motion, which are Qualities <given> in different
Degrees to <Matter>, by the <Author of Nature>, as I have, after
<Sir Isaac Newton>, shewn in the 9th Chapter of my Essay.
     But suppose, these four Qualities depended upon, or proceeded
from some other Quality or Qualities as yet unknown, neither they,
nor those Qualities upon which they depend, nor any <essential> or
<accidental> Quality that is, or can be in <Matter>, can properly be
said to be the <first Principle>, on which the mutual Influence of
Bodies depends. Because, as <Matter is in itself absolutely
passive>, no Part of Matter can ever <of itself> act upon itself, or
upon any other Part of <Matter>; and consequently, <Matter> can
never of <itself> produce any Effect. Therefore, that <active
Being>, supreme or subordinate, which we call <Spirit>, must be the
<first Principle>, on which the mutual Influence of Bodies must
always <originally> depend. This, I think, I have fully shewn in my
said Essay; and the Author will, I believe, be of my opinion, if he
will but <descend> from those <Clouds> where he now seems to
<wander>, and deign to <tread> upon the <Low>, but <solid> Surface
of <common Apprehension>.
     Now, with Regard to the Origin of that Idea we call
<Necessity>, the Author will see by reading my Essay Chap. 4th and
11th, that we never should, nor ever could have formed an Idea of
<Necessity> or <necessary> Motion, if we had not perceived in
ourselves a Motion  <that is not necessary>; and that with Regard to
the Motion of any <external> Object, it is not from any <necessary
Connexion>, or <constant Union> between Cause and Effect, that we
determine the Motion to be <necessary or voluntary>; because we see
many Motions or Effects, the Cause of which we neither see nor can
perceive: It is from <Observation>  and <Examination> only, we <in
this Case> determine; and for this very Reason, we are often liable
to be deceived in our Judgments about the <Necessity> or <Freedom>
of <external> Motions or Effects.
     As for the Author's Proof from Experience, that there is a
<constant Union> between our Actions of one Side, and our Motives,
Tempers, or Circumstances of the other, I shall grant that the
latter have a very great Influence upon the former; and it is upon
this, that <moral Certainty>, or what he calls <moral Evidence>,
depends: But every Man must be convinced from what he feels within
himself, that this Influence is not <absolute> and <necessary>; and
<Self Conviction> is a much stronger Proof than any we can have from
our <Observation> of external Objects, because we cannot know their
Tempers and Circumstances, and much less the Motives they are
governed by, so well as we do our own.
     This, I believe, will be sufficient for preventing my Author's
<Philosophy> from having nay <mischievous> Effect upon the Opinions
or Morals of Mankind; and, indeed, I should have taken no Notice of
what he has wrote, if I had not thought his Book, in several Parts,
so very abstruse and perplex'd, that, I am convinced, no Man can
comprehend what he means; and as one of the greatest Wits of this
Age has justly observed, this may impose upon weak Readers, and make
them imagine, there is a great Deal of <deep Learining> in it,
because they <do not understand it>.
     But as the same Author, in the 2d Part of his first Book sets
himself up in Opposition to the now General, and, I think, Self-
evident Opinion, That <Space> is <Divisible in infinitum>, I must
have a Word with him upon that Subject, before I leave him. His very
first Argument is founded upon a <false Position>: He affirms, that
it is a Contradiction to suppose, that nay <finite> Part of <Space>
contains an <infinite> Number of <Parts>. This is so far from being
a Contradiction, that it is certainly true, as every Man who
understands any Thing of the Nature of <Infinites>, or even of
<Space> itself, must acknowledge; for tho' a certain <Magnitude> be
necessary, for an <actual> Division of any Thing that be necessary,
for an <actual> Division of any Thing that can be divided, or for
rendering the <Parts perceptible> to us after they are divided, yet
the <Magnitude> of an Object has nothing to do with its <speculative
Divisibility>, nor does the one in the least contribute to, or
derogate from the other. We may consider an Object as a <Whole>,
without at that Time comparing our Idea called <Whole>, with our
Idea called <Parts>, which is the Case in <Mathematicks>; for a
<Mathematician's> Demonstration will hold as true, when he takes a
<Church> or a <City> for his <Mathematical> Point, as when he takes
a <Point> almost <imperceptible> to the Eye, tho' assisted by the
best magnifying Glass. But when we do actually compare our Idea
called <Whole>, with our Idea called <Parts>, it is as impossible
for us to suppose a <Whole>, without <Parts>, as it is to suppose it
without <Figure> or <Extension>.
     I shall therefore give myself no farther Trouble about my
Author's Arguments for shewing, that <Space> is not <infinitely>
divisible; for, in Truth, they seem to be as <indivisible> as his
<Space>. But I must ask him, whether he can suppose any Part of
<Space> to be void of Extension? If he does, I will say, that he
supposes it to be void of one of the <most essential> Qualities of
<Space>; and if he does not, he must then grant, that every Part of
<Space> is <Divisible>, or has <Parts>, and so on <in infinitum>:
for if I remember any Thing of the old Philosophy I learned at
School, the Definition of <Extension> was, <Quod habet Partes extra
partes>; and I am very sure, that if any <Part> of <Space> could not
be supposed to have <partes extra partes>, that is to say, it could
not be supposed to have any <Extension>.
     I shall conclude my Remarks upon this modern Piece of
<Philosophy> with observing, that when we speak <properly>, it is a
very <improper> Question to ask, if <Space> be <divisible in
infinitum>? Every Part of <Space>, the <smallest> we can imagine,
must be supposed to have <Parts>, that is to say, it must be
supposed to have <Extension>; for this is all we can mean by the
<Divisibility> of <Space>; because <no Part> of <Space>, the most
<immense> or <largest> we can imagine, can be <actually> divided;
that is to say, it is impossible to <divide Space> as we do
<Matter>, by removing or destroying that <Contiguity> which is
between any two of its <Parts>; therefore, I hope, my Readers will
suppose, that I have talked of the <infinite Divisibility of Space>,
only in Complaisance to my Author and in order to lead him, if
possible, into a right Way of thinking about those Subjects, upon
which he has wrote such a <Huge> Treatise.
     And now I must beg his Pardon for the Freedom I have taken with
him. I can upon Honour declare, I never had the least Intimation,
who he is; so that my <Criticism> cannot proceed from any <Malice>
or <Ill-will>. It proceeds entirely from the Regard I have for that
Science called <Metaphysicks>: A Science which is in itself of great
<Dignity>, because it may do infinite Service to Religion, Virtue,
and Morality, and consequently to <Religious> as well as <Civil
Liberty>, when handled in a natural and concise Manner; but it does
infinite Mischief, when, <by departing from Nature>, it is rendered
obscure, perplex'd and <contemptible>, as it has <designedly> been
for many Ages by those who were, and still are, endeavouring to
<rob> Mankind of their <Liberities>, both <religious> and <civil>,
by rendering every Man an <implicit Believer> in whatever <Opinions>
they may think fit to <propagate>, and an <abject Slave> to whatever
<Commands> they may have a Mind to <impose>.
     It is this, and this chiefly, that interests me so much in the
cause of <Metaphysicks>. <It is by them, and them only, we can
naturally> come at the Knowledge of our own Soul or Spirit, and of
the supreme Spirit that has created, and still governs the Universe;
which I call <Religion>: it is by them, and them only, we can
<naturally> come at the knowledge of those Duties we owe to Mankind,
our Country, and our Friends, which I call <Virtue>; and it is by
them, and them only, we can <naturally> come at the Knowledge of
those Duties we owe to Mankind, our Country, and our Friends, which
I call <Virtue>; and it is by them, and them only, we can
<naturally> come at the Knowledge of those Duties we owe to our
Neighbors and ourselves, which I call <Morality>. Therefore, it
behoves Mankind to have the Science of <Metaphysicks> as fully and
clearly explained as possible: It is an <Injury> to <Human Nature>
to render it obscure and perplex'd through Ignorance or Want of
Capacity: It is a <Most flagitious Crime> to do so <designedly>, for
the Sake of any <private view>; or for the Sake of <propagating> any
<particular Sect> of Religion, or any <Selfish Party> in Politicks.
<I am, Sir>,

     <Your constant Reader>
          <and humble Servant>.
          
     [1][COPYRIGHT: (c) 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu), all
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citation: <Early Commentaries on Hume's Writings>, ed. James Fieser
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     EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\)
designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets
(e.g., <Hume>) designate italics. Note references are contained
within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained
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been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note.
Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a
working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser
(jfieser@utm.edu).]
[2]Vol. II. P. 220
[3]D.
[4]D. P. 221.